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Abstract 
 
A growing body of work suggests that people are sensitive to moral framing in economic games 
involving prosociality, suggesting that people hold moral preferences for doing the “right 
thing”. What gives rise to these preferences? Here, we evaluate the explanatory power of a 
reputation-based account, which proposes that people respond to moral frames because they 
are motivated to look good in the eyes of others. Across two pre-registered experiments (total 
N = 3,610), we investigated whether reputational incentives amplify sensitivity to framing 
effects. Both experiments manipulated (i) whether moral or neutral framing was used to 
describe a Trade-Off Game (in which participants chose between prioritizing equality or 
efficiency) and (ii) whether Trade-Off Game choices were observable to a social partner in a 
subsequent Trust Game. We find that framing effects are relatively insensitive to reputational 
incentives: observability did not significantly amplify sensitivity to moral framing. However, 
our results are not inconsistent with the possibility that observability has some amplification 
effect; quantitatively, the observed framing effect was 74% as large when decisions were 
private as when they were observable. These results suggest that moral frames may tap into 
moral preferences that are relatively deeply internalized, and that power of moral frames to 
promote prosociality may not be strongly enhanced by making the morally-framed behavior 
observable to others. 
 
Keywords: moral preferences, moral frames, observability, trustworthiness, trust game, trade-
off game. 
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Introduction 
  
Humans are exceptionally prosocial. As one important illustration, many canonical 
experiments using economic games have shown that some people act prosocially even in one-
shot anonymous interactions, when no direct or indirect benefits seem to be at play (see 
Camerer (2011) for a review). Understanding what drives such prosociality is essential for the 
success of human societies, given that we face global challenges such as resource depletion, 
climate change, social and economic inequalities, and pandemics (Hardin, 1968; Trivers, 1971; 
Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Nowak, 2006; Perc et al. 2017; Van Bavel et al. 2020). 
 
One classic explanation for human prosociality—and in particular, for prosociality in one-shot 
anonymous economic games—is that people have outcome-based social preferences (Levine, 
1998; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Charness & Rabin, 2002; Engelmann 
& Strobel, 2002). This explanation poses that people care about the monetary payoffs and 
outcomes of others, not just themselves (e.g., through preferences for others to receive 
resources, or for allocations of resources to be equal). Recent research, however, has suggested 
that beyond having outcome-based social preferences, people also have “moral preferences” 
for doing the right thing. 
 
Moral Frames and Moral Preferences 
 
Over the last decade, a series of papers has revealed that people’s decisions in one-shot 
economic games depend on how the available choices are labelled, especially when the labels 
activate moral concerns. For example, Krupka and Weber (2013) found that the rate of altruism 
in the dictator game depends on how the game is framed: dictators tend to be more altruistic in 
the “take frame” compared to the “give frame”, despite the fact that the payoff outcomes for 
all parties are identical in both versions of the game. And this effect seems to be driven by 
moral considerations: dictators tend to rate “taking” from the recipient as more socially 
inappropriate than “not giving to” the recipient.  
 
Furthermore, this type of effect has been documented across a wide range of economic game 
contexts. Framing effects have been documented for six dictator game frames by Capraro and 
Vanzo (2019). Eriksson et al. (2017) found that rejection rates in the ultimatum game depend 
on how the available actions are named, such that participants are more willing to reject an 
offer when doing so is described as “rejection of an offer” versus “reduction of a payoff”. And 
like Krupka and Weber (2013), Eriksson et al. (2017) also found evidence that this framing 
effect reflected moral considerations: “reducing the proposer’s payoff” was rated as morally 
worse than “rejecting the proposer’s offer”. Finally, Capraro and Rand (2018) and Tappin and 
Capraro (2018) found that minor changes in the framing of trade-off games pitting equity 
against efficiency can massively impact people’s decisions, at least when the payoffs are not 
too large (Huang, Lei, Xu, Yu, & Shi, 2019). And evidence suggests that, again, these framing 
effects can be explained by a change in the perception of what is the moral thing to do (Capraro 
& Rand, 2018). Together, these experiments robustly illustrate that beyond having outcome- 
based social preferences concerning the payoffs of others, people have preferences for doing 
the “right thing”. 
 
These moral preferences provide a useful tool for intervening to promote prosociality. A 
growing body of work suggests that “moral suasion” (i.e., using frames that make the morality 
of an action salient) can function to increase socially desirable behavior. An earlier paper by 
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Brañas-Garza (2007) found that telling dictators that “the other person relies on you” increases 
giving. Dal Bó and Dal Bó (2014) reported that reading about the Golden Rule encourages 
cooperation in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. Capraro et al. (2019) showed that asking 
participants “what do you personally think is the right thing to do?”, prior to their participation 
in a dictator game or a prisoner’s dilemma, increased prosociality in these games. Bilancini et 
al. (2020) found that moral suasion decreased ingroup favoritism on average (although it 
increased ingroup favoritism for a subset of participants).  
 
The effect of moral suasion has also been observed in decisions that have consequences outside 
the laboratory. For example, Capraro et al. (2019) demonstrated that their moral nudge 
increases online crowdsourcing of charitable donations to humanitarian organizations by 44%, 
and Bott, Cappelen, Sørensen and Tungodden (in press) recently observed that letters with 
moral reminders decrease tax evasion among Norwegian tax-payers.  
 
Thus, previous work has both demonstrated that people readily respond to moral frames—
reflecting moral preferences for doing the right thing—and illustrated the potential for 
interventions to capitalize on moral preferences in order to encourage socially desirable 
behavior. However, much less is known about why people exhibit moral preferences and are 
sensitive to framing. What underlies the preference to do the “right” thing, and the resulting 
sensitivity to how choices are framed? Here, we consider this question, both from the 
perspective of the “ultimate” mechanisms through which moral preferences and framing effects 
may be adaptive, and the “proximate” mechanisms through which moral preferences and 
framing effects may be psychologically instantiated.  
 
A Reputation-Based Explanation for Framing Effects 
 
One potential explanation for moral preferences and framing effects comes from considering 
the role of reputation. People are strongly motivated to be seen positively by others, and thus 
reputation is an important driver of prosocial behavior (Barclay, 2004; Boyd & Richerson, 
1989; Emler, 1990; Milinski et al. 2002; Nowak & Sigmund, 2005). Supporting this proposal, 
evidence suggests that removing confidentiality increases public goods contributions 
(Andreoni & Petrie, 2004; Rege & Telle, 2004) and charity donations (Bereczkei, Birkas, & 
Kerekes, 2007; Bracha & Meier, 2009; Lacetera & Macis, 2010). (See Bradley, Lawrence and 
Ferguson (2018) for a recent meta-analysis.) Thus, one plausible reason for why people are 
sensitive to moral frames is that frames provide information about what will be seen as moral 
by other people; and, thus, responding to frames can confer reputational benefits. In other 
words, framing effects may draw on the reputation-based drive to appear moral in the eyes of 
others. 
 
Yet, we know that framing effects can occur even in contexts where nobody is watching (e.g., 
one-shot anonymous economic game experiments). On its face, this observation is inconsistent 
with the proposal that framing effects draw on reputation motives: when nobody is watching, 
people are unlikely to be explicitly concerned with looking good in the eyes of others. 
However, evidence suggests that some people rely on the heuristic that reputation is typically 
at stake and use this heuristic even in one-shot game experiments where nobody is watching 
(Jordan & Rand, 2019). Such a heuristic might function to avoid the cognitive costs of 
computing whether an interaction is likely to be observed (Delton, Krasnow, Cosmides, & 
Tooby, 2011; Kahneman, 2011; Rand, Tomlin, Bear, Ludvig, & Cohen, 2017) or the social 
costs of performing such a computation—given that carefully calculating whether to cooperate 
or not can be perceived negatively by observers (Capraro & Kuilder, 2016; Critcher, Inbar, & 
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Pizarro, 2013; Hoffman, Yoeli, & Nowak, 2015; Jordan, Hoffman, Nowak, & Rand, 2016). 
Furthermore, people might default towards behaving as if they are being watched as an “error 
management” strategy, designed to avoid the costs of mistaking a situation in which reputation 
is at stake for an anonymous situation (Delton, Krasnow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2011). 
 
Accordingly, it is plausible that framing effects do draw on reputation motives, but nonetheless 
occur in anonymous interactions because people are sensitive to reputation cues even when 
nobody is watching. Of course, a reputation-based explanation for framing effects might still 
predict that sensitivity to framing increases meaningfully in contexts where reputation is 
actually at stake, and people thus have explicit reputation motives. For example, Jordan and 
Rand (2019) found that the presence of reputational incentives can increase sensitivity to 
reputation cues among deliberative individuals (who are less likely to heuristically assume that 
reputation is at stake even in anonymous interactions). Thus, to the extent that framing effects 
draw on reputation concerns, we might expect them to increase when explicit reputational 
incentives are introduced.  
 
Here, we evaluate this prediction by investigating the extent to which sensitivity to framing is 
itself sensitive to whether or not reputation is at stake. This inquiry has important practical 
implications: if sensitivity to framing is amplified substantially by the presence of explicit 
reputational incentives, it suggests that there is substantial value in targeting framing-based 
interventions at contexts where reputation is at stake. Furthermore, investigating the effect of 
reputational incentives on sensitivity to framing can shed light on the mechanisms underlying 
framing effects. Specifically, such an investigation can shed light on the extent to which 
framing effects draw on psychological processes that are context-sensitive (and thus increase 
substantially when explicit reputational incentives are introduced) versus deeply internalized 
(and thus relatively insensitive to whether we are being watched). 
Our contribution 
In this paper, we investigate the influence of reputational incentives on sensitivity to moral 
frames in the context of the Trade-Off Game (TOG), an economic decision problem that forces 
decision-makers to decide between competing values of equality and efficiency. We chose to 
investigate decisions in the TOG because there is a robust body of evidence that, in experiments 
where reputation is not at stake, moral framing has a substantial influence on TOG decisions 
(Capraro & Rand, 2018; Tappin & Capraro, 2018; Capraro, Rodriguez-Lara, & Ruiz-Martos, 
2020; Huang, Lei, Xu, Yu, & Shi, 2019). 
 
We thus conducted two pre-registered experiments in which participants (i) decided how to 
behave in the TOG, and then (ii) participated in an economic Trust Game with another player. 
As described further below, participants participated in the Trust Game in the role of the 
“Trustee”, and thus faced incentives to appear trustworthy in the eyes of the other player.  
 
Our experiments employed a two-by-two, between-subjects design in which we manipulated 
(i) the framing used to describe participants’ TOG decisions (neutral frame vs. moral frame) 
and (ii) whether or not participants’ TOG decisions were observable to the other player in the 
Trust Game (private condition vs. public condition). This design allows us to investigate the 
extent to which activating reputation concerns (by making TOG decisions observable) 
increases sensitivity to moral framing. 
 
In the Trust Game, we also measured the extent to which focal participants actually behaved 
in a trustworthy way towards the other player. Thus, our design also allows us to ask an 
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additional question: to what extent do individuals who make morally framed choices in the 
TOG behave in a more trustworthy way in the Trust Game? Previous work has found that 
individuals who make morally framed choices in the TOG tend to behave more prosocially in 
subsequent one-shot anonymous economic games like the Dictator Game and Prisoner’s 
Dilemma (Capraro & Rand, 2018; Tappin & Capraro, 2018). These results further support the 
proposal that sensitivity to framing reflects the prosocial preference to do the right thing. And 
they lend credulity to the reputation-based hypothesis we explore in our primary analyses: 
Insofar as morally-framed choices are a meaningful signal of prosociality, it makes sense that 
the desire to appear prosocial in the eyes of others might serve to amplify sensitivity to moral 
frames. Thus, as a secondary question of interest in our paper, we sought to replicate the 
association between morally-framed choices and prosociality in the context of our paradigm. 
To this end, we investigated whether selecting the morally-framed choice in the TOG would 
serve to signal trustworthiness in the Trust Game. 
 
Method 
  
The study designs, hypotheses, and analysis plans were pre-registered. The protocols are online 
at https://aspredicted.org/yz4gk.pdf (Study 1) and https://aspredicted.org/zz5my.pdf (Study 2). 
Owing to their close similarity, we present the results of these two studies together. 
  
Samples 
  
Participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (AMT, Paolacci, Chandler & 
Ipeirotis, 2010; Horton, Rand & Zeckhauser, 2011; Paolacci & Chandler, 2014; Arechar, 
Gächter & Molleman, 2018). The sample sizes and payment information are reported below 
(subheading “Study 1 and Study 2”). 
  
Procedure and Design 
  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions, corresponding to a two-by-two, 
between-subjects design in which we manipulated Choice Frame (Neutral, Moral) and Choice 
Observability (Public, Private). We describe each of these manipulations in the context of our 
experimental procedure below. 
  
Trade-Off Game. Participants began the study by learning that they would be playing a game 
called the “Trade-Off Game” (TOG). The TOG instructions described to participants that they 
would be playing as “Player A”, and that they would be matched with two other players, 
“Player B” and “Player C”. As Player As, participants were asked to choose between one of 
two options: Option 1 (referred to by us in this paper as the equitable option) and Option 2 
(referred to by us in this paper as the efficient option). Option 1 involved providing 13 cents to 
each of the three players (Player’s A, B, and C). In contrast, Option 2 involved providing 13 
cents to Player A, 23 cents to Player B and 13 cents to Player C. Thus, Option 2 provided a 
larger total payoff for the group (and was thus desirable from an efficiency standpoint), but 
also conferred an unequal distribution of money to group members (and was thus undesirable 
from an equality standpoint).  
 
In the Neutral Frame condition, we labelled the options simply as “Option 1” and “Option 2”. 
In contrast, in the Moral Frame condition, we labelled Option 1 (i.e., the option that values 
equality) as the “fair” option. Previous research has established that, in this Moral Frame 
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condition, the vast majority of participants do think that selecting Option 1 is the morally right 
thing to do (Capraro & Rand, 2018). 
 
After reading the TOG instructions, all participants were asked two comprehension questions 
to assess their understanding of the task. 
  
Trust Game. After completing the TOG comprehension questions, participants were informed 
that they would be playing another game: The Trust Game (TG). All participants were informed 
they would be playing the TG in the role of the "Receiver” (i.e., the Trustee), and that a new 
player (who was not involved in the TOG) would be playing the TG in the role of the “Sender” 
(i.e., the Trustor). Participants were then told that the Sender would start with 30 cents and 
choose how many cents, if any, to send to them. Each cent sent would be tripled before being 
given to the participant, who would then get to decide how much, if anything, to return to the 
Sender. 
 
In the Public condition, participants were told that the Sender would learn about the existence 
of the TOG and find out about their TOG decision. In contrast, in the Private condition, 
participants were told that the Sender would not learn about the existence of the TOG or find 
out about their TOG decision. Thus, in the Public condition, participants knew that their Trust 
Game partner would observe their TOG decision before deciding how much money to entrust 
them with, whereas participants in the Private condition knew that their TOG decision would 
not be observed. 
 
Following the TG instructions, participants were asked four comprehension questions to assess 
their understanding of the task.  
  
Game Decisions. After completing the TG comprehension questions, all participants made 
their game decisions. First, they decided whether to make the equitable or efficient choice in 
the TOG, and second, they decided how much to return (as a proportion of whatever amount 
they would be sent) to their partner in the TG. In the TOG decision screen, participants were 
reminded whether their choice would (Public condition) or would not (Private condition) be 
revealed to the Sender. The TG decision screen was the same for all the participants. Verbatim 
instructions for both the TOG and TG are reported in the Supplementary Information. Finally, 
after making their decisions, participants completed a demographic questionnaire.  
  
Study 1 and Study 2. As described, we collected data in two pre-registered studies. In Study 
1, the participation payment was 50 cents and we pre-registered a target sample size of N=800 
participants. In Study 2, we pre-registered a much larger target sample size of N=3,000. The 
procedure for Study 2 was identical to the procedure for Study 1, with the exception that (i) in 
Study 2 the participation payment was 30 cents (instead of 50 cents) and we correspondingly 
shortened the demographic questionnaire to reduce the length of the survey, and (ii) in Study 2 
the stakes of both economic games were lower. Specifically, the stakes in the TOG were [5,5,5] 
vs. [5,10,5] cents (instead of [13,13,13] vs. [13,23,13]), and, in the TG, the Sender started with 
10 cents (instead of 30 cents). 
 
Disclosure statement: In these studies, we report all measures, manipulations and 
exclusions. 
 
Sensitivity power analysis: We conducted sensitivity power analyses for our primary test 
(Hypothesis 1) via simulations. The script to reproduce our simulations is available online on 
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https://osf.io/45cey/. For all simulations, we assume a moral framing effect in the private 
condition equal to an increase of 15% percentage points and a baseline of 50% (i.e., neutral-
private condition proportion = 0.50; moral-private condition proportion = 0.65). Accordingly, 
Study 1 (N = 800) had 80% power to detect an interaction between the moral frame and 
public condition assuming that the effect of the moral frame in public was approximately 
double the size of that observed in private: neutral-public condition proportion = 0.50; moral-
public condition proportion = 0.82. Owing to its larger sample size (N = 2810), Study 2 had 
80% power to detect a smaller increase in the moral frame effect in public: neutral-public 
condition proportion = 0.50, moral-public condition proportion = 0.75. The pooled data from 
Studies 1 and 2 had approximately 80% power to detect a slightly smaller effect: neutral-
public condition proportion = 0.50, moral-public condition proportion = 0.74. 
  
Ethics statement. For all the sessions, relevant ethical guidelines were followed. This 
research was approved by the MIT IRB, COUHES Protocol #: 18066392996A004. 
 
Results 
  
Data and analysis code to reproduce all results is available online at https://osf.io/45cey/. 
For all analyses, we report results among all participants (preregistered primary analyses) and 
among participants who correctly answered all comprehension questions about both economic 
games (preregistered exploratory analyses: briefly described at the end of this section, but 
reported in full in the SI).  
 
We preregistered two data exclusion criteria: We exclude responses from participants who did 
not complete all of the primary measures prior to the demographics (because these participants 
by definition could not be included in the preregistered analyses). We also exclude those who 
had duplicate IP addresses or AMT worker IDs, retaining the first response only (determined 
by the start date). Our final sample size is thus N=3610 (Study 1 N=800, Study 2 N=2810). 
Our preregistered analyses address two key questions. 
  
Analysis 1: Does observability increase sensitivity to moral framing in the TOG? 
 
Our first and primary analysis asks whether people are more sensitive to the moral framing 
manipulation when their choice is observable (versus unobservable) by their partner in the 
subsequent Trust Game. Thus, we test the two-way interaction between framing (neutral, 
moral) and observability (private, public) on TOG choices. The relevant raw data are displayed 
in Figure 1A, partitioned by study. 
 
We analyze these data using binomial logistic regression. The results for each study are 
reported in Table 1 (Analysis 1). Replicating past work and illustrating participants’ 
preferences to behave morally, we find consistent evidence across studies for a main effect of 
the moral frame: Participants are more likely to choose the equitable (vs. efficient) option in 
the TOG when that choice is framed as the “fair” option than when there is no such frame. This 
effect can be seen in Figure 1A by comparing results in the moral versus neutral frame 
conditions. In Table 2 (Analysis 1), we pool the data across the studies—including a dummy 
variable to indicate study-specific differences in the intercept—to obtain a more precise 
estimate of the moral framing estimates. 
 
Next, we turn to our key question: Does observability increase sensitivity to moral framing? 
We do not find strong evidence that it does. That is, our results imply that participants are 
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sensitive to moral framing both in private (where reputational incentives are absent, and 
participants are unlikely to be explicitly motivated by reputation concerns) and in public (where 
reputational incentives are present, and participants may be explicitly motivated by reputation 
concerns). And while the observed framing effect is directionally larger in public than in private 
(as illustrated in Figure 1A), we do not find evidence for a significant amplification in the 
presence of reputational incentives. Table 1 (Analysis 1) reveals that we do not find a 
significant interaction between our moral frame and observability manipulations in either of 
our studies individually, and Table 2 (Analysis 2) reveals that pooling data across studies to 
maximize precision gives the same result.  
 
Thus, our studies fail to provide strong evidence that observability increases sensitivity to 
moral framing, and thus suggest that moral framing may be similarly effective in the absence 
versus presence of reputational incentives. To provide a quantitative sense of this conclusion, 
we note that, pooling data across both studies, we find that the moral framing effect in the 
Private condition is approximately 74% as large as the moral framing effect in the Public 
condition.  
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Figure 1. Data from Studies 1 and 2. (A) Proportion of participants choosing to split the 
money equitably in the Trade-Off Game as a function of observability (Private, Public) and 
choice frame (Moral, Neutral). (B) Percentage of money returned in the Trust Game as a 
function of observability (Private, Public), choice frame (Moral, Neutral), and choice made in 
the Trade-Off Game (Efficient, Equitable). Large solid points are the means in each cell. 
Smaller faded points are the raw data with slight jitter to aid visibility.  (A, B) Error bars are 
95% CI. N = 800 in Study 1; N = 2810 in Study 2.  
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Table 1. Results from Analyses 1 and 2 in each of Studies 1 and 2. 
 
Analysis Study Term Estimate 95 LL 95 UL p-value 
1       
 1 (Intercept) 0.96 0.71 1.28 .766 
  Moral Frame 1.38 0.93 2.05 .107 
  Public Condition 0.75 0.51 1.12 .158 
  Moral x Public 1.54 0.87 2.70 .135 
 2 (Intercept) 0.78 0.68 0.90 .001 
  Moral Frame 1.89 1.53 2.34 < .001 
  Public Condition 0.92 0.74 1.13 .423 
  Moral x Public 1.14 0.84 1.54 .391 
2a       
 1 (Intercept) 30.83 25.36 36.31 < .001 
  Equitable Choice 6.80 -0.45 14.06 .067 
 2 (Intercept) 37.75 34.71 40.78 < .001 
  Equitable Choice 4.10 0.17 8.03 .041 
2b       
 1 (Intercept) 29.02 23.57 34.48 < .001 
  Equitable Choice 9.96 2.15 17.76 .013 
  Moral Frame 1.81 -5.82 9.45 .642 
  Equitable x Moral -3.15 -13.69 7.38 .558 
 2 (Intercept) 41.17 38.65 43.69 < .001 
  Equitable Choice -3.47 -7.27 0.34 .074 
  Moral Frame -3.43 -7.43 0.57 .093 
  Equitable x Moral 7.56 2.03 13.1 .007 
Note. Analysis 1 model estimates and CIs are odds ratios. Analysis 2a and 2b are OLS 
estimates. LL = Lower Limit. UL = Upper Limit. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
Table 2. Results from Analyses 1 and 2 pooling the data across Studies 1 and 2. 
 
Analysis Term Estimate 95 LL 95 UL p-value 
1      
 (Intercept) 0.82 0.69 0.99 .037 
 Moral Frame 1.77 1.47 2.13 < .001 
 Public Condition 0.88 0.73 1.06 .184 
 Study 2 Dummy 0.99 0.84 1.16 .854 
 Moral x Public 1.22 0.93 1.59 .145 
2a      
 (Intercept) 31.99 28.04 35.94 < .001 
 Equitable Choice 4.77 1.31 8.23 .007 
 Study 2 Dummy 5.35 1.40 9.30 .008 
2b      
 (Intercept) 34.45 31.13 37.77 < .001 
 Equitable Choice -0.83 -4.25 2.59 .635 
 Moral Frame -2.59 -6.13 0.95 .152 
 Study 2 Dummy 5.52 2.59 8.45 < .001 
 Equitable x Moral 5.60 0.70 10.50 .025 
Note. Analysis 1 model estimates and CIs are odds ratios. Analysis 2a and 2b are OLS 
estimates. LL = Lower Limit. UL = Upper Limit. 
 
Analysis 2: Do Morally-Framed Decisions Signal Trustworthiness? 
 
Our second analysis asks whether morally-framed decisions signal trustworthiness, and is 
broken into two parts. To address this question, we first ask in Analysis 2a whether participants 
who choose the morally-framed option (i.e., the equitable choice) in the TOG behave in a more 
trustworthy manner in the subsequent Trust Game. Then, in Analysis 2b, we turn to asking 
whether any such association depends on the presence of the moral frame, or is instead 
explained by a general association between equitable choices and trustworthiness (that holds 
irrespective of framing). The relevant raw data are shown in Figure 1B.  
 
In these analyses, we investigate the association between morally-framed choices and 
trustworthiness in the Private condition of our paradigm, in which reputational incentives were 
absent and thus sensitivity to moral framing can only reflect “pure” preferences for doing the 
right thing. This approach has the advantage of allowing us to straightforwardly compare our 
results to previous work investigating the association between morally-framed choices and 
prosociality, which has employed one-shot anonymous games that are analogous to our Private 
condition (Capraro & Rand, 2018; Tappin & Capraro, 2018). These analyses were thus 
preregistered as primary analyses because we had clear theoretical predictions. Because we did 
not have clear theoretical predictions about how the Public condition might affect the 
association between morally-framed choices and trustworthiness, we preregistered analyses on 
the Public condition as exploratory, and we prioritize brevity by not additionally reporting 
those analyses here. However, we note that interested readers can get a visual sense of the 
relevant associations from Figure 1B, and we report formal results from these exploratory 
analyses on the Public condition specifically in the SI. 
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Analysis 2a. We first examine the trustworthiness of participants in the Private condition who 
received the moral frame in the TOG. This functions as a basic test of whether participants who 
choose the equitable option behaved in a more trustworthy manner than participants who 
choose the efficient option, when the equitable option is framed as morally good and decisions 
are private. Understood with respect to Figure 1B, this test compares the first two cells of the 
Private condition. We analyze these data using OLS regression. The results for each study are 
reported in Table 1 (Analysis 2a), and the pooled estimate across both studies is reported in 
Table 2 (Analysis 2a). 
 
We find some evidence that participants who chose the equitable option returned more in the 
subsequent Trust Game than participants who chose the efficient option: the estimates in both 
studies are positive, and the p-values on the estimates are .067 (Study 1) and .041 (Study 2). 
Thus, we find some evidence that equitable choices predict trustworthiness—when such 
choices are framed as morally good and all decisions are private. 
 
Analysis 2b. We next proceed to ask: Is the association identified in Analysis 2a observed only 
when the equitable choice is framed as morally good, or does it instead reflect a general 
association between equitable choices and trustworthiness (that holds irrespective of framing)? 
 
To address this question, we investigate the two-way interaction between framing (neutral, 
moral) and TOG choice (equitable, efficient) on trustworthiness in the TG. Understood with 
respect to Figure 1B, this test compares the difference between the first two cells of the Private 
condition with the difference between the latter two cells of the Private condition. We analyze 
these data using OLS regression. The results for each study are reported in Table 1 (Analysis 
2b), and the pooled estimate across both studies is reported in Table 2 (Analysis 2b). 
 
We find some evidence that participants who chose the equitable (versus efficient) option 
returned more in the subsequent Trust Game only when the equitable option was framed as 
morally good. Specifically, while there is no support for this pattern (even directionally) in 
Study 1, the evidence does support it in Study 2, and in the pooled estimate across both studies 
(as indicated by the significant positive interaction). Thus, we find some evidence that, when 
decisions are private, equitable choices specifically predict trustworthiness when they are 
framed as morally good.  
 
Together, the results of Analysis 2 are thus broadly supportive of the proposal that, in a context 
where reputational incentives are absent—and thus sensitivity to moral framing can only reflect 
“pure” moral preferences—morally-framed choices possess some value as a signal of 
trustworthiness. 
 
Exploratory Analyses Among Perfect Comprehenders 
 
Finally, as mentioned, we also conducted the above analyses (i.e., 1, 2a, and 2b) on a restricted 
sample of participants: those who correctly answered all the comprehension questions for the 
TOG and TG, dubbed “perfect comprehenders”. The results are reported in figures and tables 
in the SI. The main result of note is that, in Study 2, Analysis 1 on the perfect comprehenders, 
we do observe a statistically significant interaction between moral frame and public condition 
(p = .029), reflecting that the moral framing effect on TOG choice is larger in public, and this 
difference is statistically distinguishable at the .05 level.  
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Discussion 
A growing body of research has illustrated that people are sensitive to framing when making 
moral decisions. This research suggests that beyond having outcome-based social preferences 
(e.g., for others to receive resources, or for resource allocations to be equal), people also have 
preferences for doing the “right” thing. In this work, we have investigated the extent to which 
reputational incentives serve to amplify sensitivity to framing effects, and thus the extent to 
which the moral preferences underlying framing effects are sensitive to whether reputation is 
at stake. And we have provided evidence that framing effects are relatively insensitive to the 
presence of reputational incentives. In our studies, participants responded to frames even when 
their decisions were completely private, and we did not find reliable evidence that introducing 
reputational incentives increases sensitivity to framing.  
Importantly, our results are not inconsistent with the possibility that reputational incentives do 
have some power to increase sensitivity to framing. Directionally, we did find larger framing 
effects when reputation was at stake; recall that across our two studies, the framing effect was 
74% as large in the Private condition as in the Public condition. Furthermore, as briefly noted 
in our results, in our exploratory analyses of participants who correctly answered all 
comprehension questions, we do find some evidence that reputational incentives amplify 
sensitivity to framing. Yet in our pre-registered primary analyses of all participants, across two 
studies with a total N of 3,610 (providing approximately 80% power to detect a minimum 
increase in sensitivity to framing of nine percentage points), we were not able to detect 
significant amplification. We thus see our results as suggesting that framing effects are 
relatively insensitive to the presence of reputational incentives, and that reputational incentives 
do not strongly amplify sensitivity to moral frames. 
Our studies do, however, lend more support to the proposal that morally-framed choices serve 
as a reliable signal of trustworthiness. In our secondary analyses, we found evidence that 
equitable decisions in the Tradeoff Game predict returning in the Trust Game—but only when 
such choices are framed as morally good. These analyses are consistent with previous evidence 
that morally-framed decisions predict prosocial behavior (Capraro & Rand, 2018; Tappin & 
Capraro, 2018), and serve to further bolster the proposal that sensitivity to moral framing 
reflects the prosocial preference to do the right thing. They also lend credulity to the reputation-
based hypothesis we investigated in our primary analyses by suggesting that sensitivity to 
moral framing may be an effective reputational strategy (insofar as observers are aware that 
morally-framed choices signal prosociality). Thus, it is all the more notable that sensitivity to 
framing is relatively insensitive to the presence of reputational incentives. 
Our results have important implications for interventions that draw on framing effects to 
encourage socially desirable behavior. They suggest that such interventions can be successful 
even when behavior is not observable to others and thus reputation is not at stake—and in fact, 
that the efficacy of framing effects is not strongly enhanced by making behavior observable. 
Thus, our results suggest that targeting contexts where reputation is at stake is not an especially 
important priority for individuals seeking to maximize the impact of framing-based 
interventions. This conclusion provides an optimistic view of the potential of framing-based 
interventions, given that there may be many contexts in which it is difficult to make behavior 
observable but yet possible to frame a decision in a way that encourages prosociality. 
Our results also have important implications for the psychology underlying framing effects. 
Specifically, they suggest that framing effects draw on preferences that are relatively deeply 
internalized (and thus are relatively insensitive to the presence of reputational incentives). This 
observation could reflect that reputation systems do not explain why people are sensitive to 
14 
framing. In other words, our results could reflect that people react to framing not because they 
see frames as conveying information about what others will see as moral, but rather because 
they see frames as conveying information about what actually is moral—and frames tap into a 
general and deeply internalized desire to behave morally (and/or think of the self as behaving 
morally) (Ariely, Bracha, & Meier, 2009; Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008). Such a desire would 
serve to encourage cooperative and moral behavior, and thus could be supported by many 
ultimate mechanisms beyond reputation systems that can give rise to cooperative and moral 
behavior (e.g., direct reciprocity, kin selection, institutions, and cultural group selection) (Boyd 
& Richerson, 2009; Henrich, 2006; Nowak, 2006; Trivers, 1971). 
Alternatively, however, our results could be compatible with the proposal that reputation 
systems explain why people are sensitive to framing. Specifically, our results could reflect that 
people do react to framing because frames convey information about what others will see as 
moral—and consequently do tap into a more specific desire to appear moral in the eyes of 
others that is ultimately supported specifically by reputation systems. However, insofar as 
reputation is the primary driver of framing effects, our results suggest that the relevant 
reputation motives are strongly activated even in anonymous experiments, such that 
introducing reputational incentives does not substantially amplify framing effects. This 
possibility is consistent with the proposal that even when nobody is watching and people are 
not explicitly concerned with their reputations, they may nonetheless be implicitly motivated to 
appear virtuous—reflecting the use of heuristics (specifically, the heuristic that reputation is 
typically at stake) (Jordan & Rand, 2019) and/or error management strategies (specifically, 
strategies designed to avoid the costs of mistaking a situation in which reputation is at stake for 
an anonymous situation) (Delton et al., 2011). 
Regardless, however, our results suggest that framing effects function by drawing on 
preferences that are not highly sensitive to the presence of reputational incentives. And 
consequently, they suggest that a sensitivity to framing effects—and the underlying preference 
to behave morally—may be thought of as a core and deeply internalized feature of our moral 
psychology. This conclusion implies that we might expect framing effects to be relatively 
robust and invariant across contexts, a prediction that should be probed further in future 
research. In particular, an interesting question is whether introducing reputational incentives 
may be a more effective strategy for amplifying the power of framing effects in contexts where 
the baseline sensitivity to framing is relatively low (e.g., because making the morally framed 
decision is particularly costly or difficult). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
References 
 
Andreoni, J., & Petrie, R. (2004). Public goods experiments without confidentiality: a 
glimpse into fund-raising. Journal of Public Economics, 88(7-8), 1605-1623. 
Arechar, A. A., Gächter, S., & Molleman, L. (2018). Conducting interactive experiments 
online. Experimental Economics, 21, 99-131. 
Ariely, D., Bracha, A., & Meier, S. (2009). Doing good or doing well? Image motivation and 
monetary incentives in behaving prosocially. American Economic Review, 99(1), 544-
55. 
Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. D. (1981). The evolution of cooperation. Science, 211, 1390-
1396. 
Barclay, P. (2004). Trustworthiness and competitive altruism can also solve the “tragedy of 
the commons.” Evolution and Human Behavior, 25(4), 209–220 
Bereczkei, T., Birkas, B., & Kerekes, Z. (2007). Public charity offer as a proximate factor of 
evolved reputation-building strategy: an experimental analysis of a real-life situation. 
Evolution and Human Behavior, 28, 277-284. 
Bilancini, E., Boncinelli, L., Capraro, V., Celadin, T., & Di Paolo, R. (2020). “Do the right 
thing” for whom? An experiment on ingroup favouritism, group assorting and moral 
suasion. Judgment and Decision Making, 15, 182-192. 
Bolton, G. E., & Ockenfels, A. (2000). ERC: A theory of equity, reciprocity, and 
competition. American Economic Review, 90, 166-193. 
Bott, K. M., Cappelen, A. W., Sørensen, E. Ø., & Tungodden, B. (2019). You’ve got mail: A 
randomized field experiment on tax evasion. Management Science. 
Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J. (1989). The evolution of indirect reciprocity. Social Networks, 
11(3), 213–236. 
Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J. (2009). Culture and the evolution of human cooperation. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 364(1533), 
3281–3288 
Bradley, A., Lawrence, C., & Ferguson, E. (2018). Does observability affect prosociality? 
Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 285, 20180116. 
Brañas-Garza, P. (2007). Promoting helping behavior with framing in dictator games. 
Journal of Economic Psychology, 28, 477-486. 
Camerer, C. F. (2011). Behavioral game theory: Experiments in strategic interaction. 
Princeton University Press. 
Capraro, V., Jagfeld, G., Klein, R., Mul, M., & van de Pol, I. (2019). Increasing altruistic and 
cooperative behaviour with simple moral nudges. Scientific Reports, 9, 11880. 
Capraro, V., & Kuilder, J. (2016). To know or not to know? Looking at payoffs signals 
selfish behavior, but it does not actually mean so. Journal of Behavioral and 
Experimental Economics, 65, 79-84. 
Capraro, V., & Rand, D. G. (2018). Do the right thing: Experimental evidence that 
preferences for moral behaviour, rather than equity or efficiency per se, drive human 
prosociality. Judgment and Decision Making, 13, 99-111. 
Capraro, V., Rodriguez-Lara, I., & Ruiz-Martos, M. J. (2020). Preferences for efficiency, 
rather than preferences for morality, drive cooperation in the one-shot Stag-Hunt 
Game. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics. 
Capraro, V., & Vanzo, A. (2019). The power of moral words: Loaded language generates 
framing effects in the extreme dictator game. Judgment and Decision Making, 14, 
309-317. 
16 
Charness, G., & Rabin, M. (2002). Understanding social preferences with simple tests. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117, 817-869. 
Critcher, C. R., Inbar, Y., & Pizarro, D. A. (2013). How quick decisions illuminate moral 
character. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 4, 308-315. 
Dal Bó, E., & Dal Bó, P. (2014). “Do the right thing:” The effects of moral suasion on 
cooperation. Journal of Public Economics, 117, 28-38. 
Delton, A. W., Krasnow, M. M., Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (2011). Evolution of direct 
reciprocity under uncertainty can explain human generosity in one-shot encounters. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108, 13335-13340. 
Dufwenberg, M., & Muren, A. (2006). Generosity, anonymity, gender. Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization, 61, 42-49. 
Emler, N. (1990). A social psychology of reputation. European Review of Social Psychology, 
1(1), 171–193 
Engelmann, D., & Strobel, M. (2004). Inequality aversion, efficiency, and maximin 
preferences in simple distribution experiments. American Economic Review, 94, 857-
869. 
Eriksson, K., Strimling, P., Andersson, P. A., & Lindholm, T. (2017). Costly punishment in 
the ultimatum game evokes moral concern, in particular when frames as payoff 
reduction. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 69, 59-64. 
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (1999). A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 817-868. 
Glazer, A., & Konrad, K. A. (1996). A signaling explanation for charity. The American 
Economic Review, 86(4), 1019-1028. 
Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science, 162, 1243-1248. 
Henrich, J. (2006). Cooperation, punishment, and the evolution of human institutions. 
Science, 311(5769), 60–61. 
Hoffman, M., Yoeli, E., & Nowak, M. A. (2015). Cooperate without looking: Why we care 
what people think and not just what they do. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, 112(6), 1727-1732. 
Horton, J. J., Rand, D. G., & Zeckhauser, R. J. (2011). The online laboratory: Conducting 
experiments in a real labor market. Experimental Economics, 14, 399-425. 
Huang, L., Lei, W., Xu, F., Yu, L., & Shi, F. (2019). Choosing an equitable or efficient 
option: A distribution dilemma. Social Behavior & Personality, 47, e8559. 
Jordan, J. J., Hoffman, M., Nowak, M. A., & Rand, D. G. (2016). Uncalculating cooperation 
is used to signal trustworthiness. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 
113, 8658-8663. 
Jordan, J. J., & Rand, D. G. (2019). Signaling when no one is watching: A reputation 
heuristics account of outrage and punishment in one-shot anonymous interactions. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. Macmillan. 
Krupka, E. L., & Weber, R. A. (2013). Identifying social norms using coordination games: 
Why does dictator game sharing vary? Journal of the European Economic 
Association,11, 495-524. 
Lacetera, N., & Macis, M. (2010). Social image concerns and prosocial behavior: Field 
evidence from a nonlinear incentive scheme. Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization, 76, 225-237. 
Lambarraa, F., & Riener, G. (2015). On the norms of charitable giving in Islam: Two field 
experiments in Morocco. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 118, 69-84. 
Levine, D. K. (1998). Modeling altruism and spitefulness in experiments. Review of 
Economic Dynamics, 1, 593-622. 
17 
Mazar, N., Amir, O., & Ariely, D. (2008). The dishonesty of honest people: A theory of self-
concept maintenance. Journal of marketing research, 45(6), 633-644. 
Milinski, M., Semmann, D., & Krambeck, H.-J. (2002). Reputation helps solve the ‘tragedy 
of the commons.’ Nature, 415(6870), 424–426 
Nowak, M. A. (2006). Five rules for the evolution of cooperation. Science, 314, 1560-1563. 
Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (2005). Evolution of indirect reciprocity. Nature, 437(7063), 
1291–1298. 
Paolacci, G., & Chandler, J. (2014). Inside the Turk: Understanding Mechanical Turk as a 
participant pool. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 23, 184-188. 
Paolacci, G., Chandler, J., & Ipeirotis, P. G. (2010). Running experiments on Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. Judgment and Decision Making, 5, 411-419. 
Perc, M., Jordan, J. J., Rand, D. G., Wang, Z., Boccaletti, S., & Szolnoki, A. (2017). 
Statistical physics of human cooperation. Physics Reports, 687, 1-51. 
Rand, D., & Nowak, M. (2013). Human cooperation. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 17(8), 
413–425. 
Rand, D. G., Tomlin, D., Bear, A., Ludvig, E. A., & Cohen, J. D. (2017). Cyclical population 
dynamics of automatic versus controlled processing: An evolutionary pendulum. 
Psychological Review, 124, 626-642. 
Rege, M., & Telle, K. (2004). The impact of social approval and framing on cooperation in 
public good situations. Journal of Public Economics, 88(7-8), 1625-1644. 
Soetevent, A. R. (2005). Anonymity in giving in a natural context—a field experiment in 30 
churches. Journal of Public Economics, 89(11-12), 2301-2323. 
Tappin, B. M., & Capraro, V. (2018). Doing good vs. avoiding bad in prosocial choice: A 
refined test and extension of the morality preference hypothesis. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 79, 64-70. 
Trivers, R. L. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. The Quarterly Review of Biology, 
46, 35-57. 
Van Bavel, J. J., Baicker, K., Boggio, P., Capraro, V., Cichocka, A., Cikara, M., … Willer, R. 
(2020). Using social and behavioural science to support COVID-19 pandemic 
response. Nature Human Behaviour. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
